Drivers of Foreign Policy

Since the peaceful coup that brought the current amir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to index finger in 1995, Qatar has entered into an progressively expanding alien constitution, which has greatly increase the state of matters regional and international standing. The main feature of Qatars irrelevant indemnity is its parting as intermediary and negotiator in a turning of conflicts in the mettle eastern United States and elsewhere, for drill in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen. In each(prenominal) case, Qatar prided itself on engaging with warring factions to rouse for political settlements or rapprochement, as well(p) as providing humanitarian assistance.The decisions governing Qatars intimacy in such conflicts are rattling central. The main decision-makers are the Emir, His Highness fashion plate Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, thrill subgenus Pastor and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani. Restricting much of the decision-making of this subtile stack has quickly led to foreign (and local) policy decisions, al depressive disordering Qatar to respond quickly to emerging conflicts with inter mediation offers.While it can be say that drawing a picture of the country as a benefactor is a public diplomatic move by Qatar since neutrality facilitates the consolidation of credibility among seven-fold audiences there are deeper motives behind Qatars expansionist approach to mediating the conflict by expanding its foreign policy.The first motive is to maintain its guarantor and stability. Qatar is located in the Arabian Peninsula, an arena full of political and military rivalries. By increasing its international standing, Qatar aims to protect itself from the dangers of non-disclosure of small and vulnerable states 5 risks of the type suffered by Kuwait in 1990. 6 In addition, by engaging in mediation between conflicting factions such as Houthis and the Yemeni governm ent.Or between al-Jihad and its allies on the one(a) slew and the exhibit 14 bloc on the other, Qatar can be seen as attempt to contain those conflicts and prevent their spread nestled to home. This inevitability make ups more(prenominal) acute when one considers the section Iran accepts in those conflicts and in the disconnectedness in particular. Iran is the main backer of al-Jihad and has established links with the Huthis in Yemen and a number of Shiite movements in the Gulf.Qatar withal touchs the largest embrocate field in the world with Iran, and is fully aware of Irans expansionist foreign policy objectives in the region. By difficult to intermediate between non- Persian actors and their rivals, Qatar is trying to counter Iranian influence in the Middle eastward in general, and more specifically in the Gulf, while maintaining friendly relations with Iran. Thus, in addition to general security concerns, Irans map in the region can be seen as a clear device dr iver behind Qatars mediation of the Middle east conflict.The third motive for Qatari mediation is the desire to expand its influence as a regional worker, especially in the face of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has traditionally played a leading role in conflicts throughout the region, for example during the Lebanese civil war. However, in recent historic period Saudi mediation has been spoiled for sensed neutrality, making the Kingdom an active player rather than a neutral intermediary.The obstruct relationship between Saudi Arabia and the March 14 political bloc in Lebanon, led by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, is an example. Qatar therefore viewed a make clean in the Arab international relations it was trying to bridge. Its involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond is an effort to cede itself as a vital choice to Saudi Arabia and a potential untested leader in the Middle East.This role was further enhanced by Qatars social station of the United Natio ns Security Council in 2006-2007, during which the Emirate increased its regional mediation and assistance activities. However, Qatar was piercing not to exceed the limits of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Despite Qatars view of Saudi Arabias low influence in the Middle East (in addition to the growing Iranian influence, which adds to the urgent need for regional Arab leadership), the country form cautious not to conflict with the kingdoms interior(prenominal) and foreign policies.Thus, when the Bahraini uprising began in 2011, Qatar supported the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led by Saudi Arabia mission to quell the insurgency. 7 When the Yemeni uprising, which began in the same year, gained momentum, Qatar also supported the GCC initiative it managed.The path of musical passage in Yemen, leading to a negotiated conversion instead of overthrowing the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although Qatars relationship with Saudi Arabia over the years has been turbulent, it has finally reached a rapprochement in 2008 and has continued to become more entrenched, driven by Qatari realism and the Emirates awareness of the limits of its influence in the Gulf.Saudi Arabia is the dominant political power in the Arabian Peninsula, where Qatar has not nevertheless had the opportunity or the ability to play the first major role. Both countries share concerns about the instability and political change that are reaching their territory, which leads them to cooperate more than confrontation.